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# THE SOUL—A STUDY OF PAST AND PRESENT BELIEFS.

By L. D. ARNETT.

## II

### PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE SOUL.

Alger<sup>1</sup> states the following as the psychological arguments for the soul:

(1) All motion implies a dynamic mover, matter is dormant, man is an active power, a free will; so there must be in him an immaterial principle, this is immortal. (2) If we admit the human soul to be material, an ultimate monad, an indivisible atom of mind, it is immortal, defying all forces. The soul as such a unit-consciousness is simple, and its power is an absolute integer. A soul is a simple substance (Herbart) not liable to death but eternal. (3) Indestructibility of soul is a direct influence from ontological characteristics. Reason cannot but embrace the conviction of its perpetuity and its independence of fleshly organization. Our life is best defined as conscious force, our present existence as the correlation of that force with the physical materials of the body and with other forces.

In beginning the chapter it is well to mention that modern psychology questions any use of the word soul, unless the author restricts the term, stating specifically how he desires it to be understood. Lotze uses the word soul but makes the proviso that it be used "future-proof." Ribot<sup>2</sup> objects very strongly to the use of the word and thinks it should be omitted from future psychology altogether. James uses the term in a popular way only, and Dr. Royce<sup>3</sup> says, "If your consciousness is merely based upon an existence, which lies beneath the consciousness and which never comes to light as your own present will and meaning, you gain nothing but a name when this unobserved substratum of your own personality is called your soul." The chief objections urged against the use of the word are (1) that it carries with it the idea of substance, from the metaphysical and theological discussions of the past, and psychologists feel that they have cut loose from this. (2) Ex-

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<sup>1</sup>The Doctrine of a Future Life, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup>English Psychology, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup>The World and the Individual, Vol. II, p. 291.

perimental Psychology has tended to create an exact science. Psychologists who have been thus trained do not desire to use a term that ascribes immortality to psychic phenomena, the elements of which they attempt not only to study qualitatively and quantitatively but to establish the underlying principles and laws. Those psychologists can, in fact, discuss "soul" scientifically only as a mental development based on material furnished by the senses.

This section presents some of the ideas of psychologists as to the nature of the soul and attempts to study it from their standpoint. The question that presents itself is, where shall we begin, how shall we distinguish the psychologist from the theologian or philosopher. Külpe<sup>1</sup> distinguishes three periods in the history of psychology.

(1) "In the first, mind, the substrate of all psychical phenomena, is identified with the vital principle. This view carries with it a very broad interpretation of psychology.

(2) "In the second, the province of mind is limited by the definition of 'mental' as that which can be known by internal perception.

(3) "The third makes the psychical coextensive with the subjective."

The view presented in the first period prevailed in antiquity; Aristotle was its most worthy representative. It had certain followers during the Middle Ages. John Locke, he points out, as the first representative of the second period. Other<sup>2</sup> writers regard Descartes as the founder of modern psychology, and early representatives<sup>3</sup> as Hobbes and Spinoza. Ribot notes that in the seventeenth century the science of the soul was called metaphysics, and was so used by Descartes, Malebranch and Leibnitz, Locke and Condillac, and that the word psychology was invented by Goclenius, and later used by Wolf as the title of a work. Certain it is that the writings of Descartes mark a new era, and for the illustrations cited in this study we shall begin with him.

As was noted, earlier writers had not differentiated the psychology of man from that of angels and even God. We find that Descartes considers a number of subjects which class him as a philosopher of that time, but he is also an analytic psychologist. Whatever in the life of the human soul concerns the relation of it to the material world he explains as mechanism. Here Höffding notes that Descartes greatly reduced the number of souls in the universe by his mechanical explanations excluding from the category every form of life below man. Permanent material changes in the brain, when the senses are acted upon, account for the association of ideas; these changes influ-

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Philosophy, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup> Janet and Seailles: *Hist. of the Prob. of Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Baldwin *Dict. of Phil. and Psy.*, Vol. II.

ence the subsequent development of ideas. As an extended being, the soul can be in contact with the body only at one point. This point, as is generally known, Descartes thought must be in the brain, and more precisely in the pineal gland. This gland is selected as the central point because, unlike most organs, it is simple, consisting of one part only. In fact it is a central part of the brain. The action of the soul on the body and the body on the soul demands the concurrence of God; interaction is not prohibited by the complete unlikeness in nature of the body and the soul. Body, and soul or spirit, represent a dualism of heterogeneous entities, separated in nature by an unfilled interval, the existence of our souls apart from our bodies is inferred. The nature of mind consists in thought, true knowledge in clear and distinct thought. The passions of the soul are related to man as motion to body, they require the union of mind and body, they are the ground of knowledge of soul and body. There is but one body which is united with a mind or animated with a soul and that is the human body, animals are mere machines destitute of mind and soul. The soul is the mind; without self-consciousness there is no thought, mind nor soul. Animals feel, have sensations and impulse, but not self-consciousness.

"I desire<sup>1</sup> you to notice that these functions (animal) follow quite naturally in the machine from the arrangement of its organs, exactly as those of a clock, or other automaton, from that of its weights and wheels; so that we must not conceive or explain them by any other vegetative or sensitive soul, or principle of motion and life, than its blood and its spirits agitated by the heat of the fire which burns continually in the heart, and which is of no other kind than all the fires which are contained in inanimate bodies."

To this arrangement the soul must be created. On this he says: "I had<sup>2</sup> after this described the reasonable soul and shown that it could by no means be educed from the power of matter . . . but that it must be expressly created; and that it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless, perhaps, to move its members, but that it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours and thus constitute a real man." The way in which the body and soul are connected through the passions may be gathered from the following:

"The passions<sup>3</sup> cannot be directly excited or removed by the action of our will; but they can indirectly through the representation of those things which are usually joined with the passions we wish to have and which are contrary to those we wish to reject." Although each movement of the gland appears to have been joined by nature to each one of our thoughts since the beginning of our life, it is nevertheless possible, through habit, to join them to other thoughts. "And such is the connection between soul and body that when we have once joined a certain bodily act to a certain thought, the one will in future never occur without the other."

But Descartes maintains that the soul may exist independent of the body: "Since,<sup>4</sup> on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in so far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, that is my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from my body and may exist without it." The subject-matter of mediæval philosophy to a great extent influenced Descartes; philosophy and

<sup>1</sup> Treatise on Man. Mahaffy, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Discourse on Method, Part V, Tr. by Veitch.

<sup>3</sup> Pass., 45, 50, and 136.

<sup>4</sup> Sixth Meditation.

psychology are yet undifferentiated. Contemporary with Descartes, in England, Hobbes wrote his treatise on philosophy. This work embodied principles of associational psychology. The mental powers are two-fold, cognitive and motive. The cognitive power gives the imagery of external things, this remains after the object is removed. The motive power involves and is dependent on the function of mental representation.<sup>1</sup> Mechanical laws are applied to psychical activities. In sensation the inward motion by way of the sense organ calls forth an outward reaction from the brain or heart, physical motion is thus involved in a psychical process; some trace, for memory, is always left from a sensation. As the vital motion of the heart is helped or hindered there rises pleasure or pain. Appetite or aversion is the endeavor to or from something, based on pleasure or pain. "Will is the last appetite in deliberating." If anything really exists it is and must appear extended; unless it does it is phantasmal. Ideas and volitions are at bottom activities of the body; the immortal soul, and divine mind or spirit, fall in the province of theology. Soul or spirit is either brain action or nerve substance; the spirit is a physical body too refined to escape the senses, as incorporeal it does not exist. For Bacon, and as noted also by Hobbes, certain lines of investigation fall outside the realm of philosophy under the head of theology.

Seailles<sup>2</sup> regards Malebranche as the founder of experimental psychology. His idea in regard to mind and body is that we have a clearer knowledge of our bodies than of our minds. "Although we know the existence of our souls more distinctly than the existence of our own bodies, or of the bodies that surround us, still we have not so perfect a knowledge of the nature of the soul as of the nature of the body." We know the soul through consciousness only, and for this reason imperfectly. "The consciousness which I have of myself informs me that I am, that I think, and desire, and feel, and suffer, etc., but it does not tell me what I am, or the essence of my thought, or of my will, my feelings, my passions, and my pain; nor do I learn through it the ratios between all these things, because again, having no idea of my soul — being unable to see its archetype in the Divine World — I cannot discover by contemplating either what it is, or the modes of which it is capable." The only connection between body and mind is natural and mutual correspondence between the thoughts of the mind and the traces of the brain.

The soul<sup>3</sup> cannot produce nor possess ideas, they are and remain only in God; what we see and know is through Him alone. Malebranche was a follower of Descartes. Locke is regarded as the founder of the empirical method of psychology. According to him the soul is originally like a piece of white and blank paper. There are no innate ideas. All knowledge has its basis in experience; this may be external, taking the form of sensation, or internal as reflection, depending on the place of the object of knowledge, whether it belongs to the world of external sensible objects, or to the internal operations of our mind. The senses convey from external objects into the mind that which, in the latter, is the source of ideas, viz.: sensible qualities. The mind, employed through the ideas already acquired, is the seat of operations, in some of which it is active, in others passive. When the mind considers these activities and states and reflects on them, the understanding receives another set of ideas, which cannot arise from the things without; — such activities are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, and willing. From one of these

<sup>1</sup> Robertson-Hobbes, pp. 123-135.

<sup>2</sup> Janet and Seailles: *Hist. of the Prob. of Phil.*, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Fischer: *Descartes and His School*, pp. 569-77.

two sources spring all our ideas. Previous to the first sensible impression the soul no more thinks than it does subsequently in dreamless sleep. That the soul always thinks is as arbitrary an assertion as that all bodies are continually in motion. The ideas of pleasure or delight, of pain or uneasiness, and of existence, unity, power, and succession are conveyed to the soul both through the senses and through reflection. Qualities are of two kinds: (1) primary—those of bulk, figure, motion, etc.; (2) secondary—those of color, sound, smell, etc. No contradiction is involved in supposing that God has annexed to certain motives, ideas, which bear no resemblance to them. The complex of mental life is the result of experience. Thinking is an activity of the mind as motion is of the body, not its essential characteristic. External objects occasion perception through impressions; the mind is not able to avert this; as a passive organ it is acted upon and fashioned. Locke defines self<sup>1</sup> as "that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, simple or compound, it matters not), which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident that the little finger would be the person, the same person, and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separated from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self; so it is in reference to substances remote in time."

Locke's psychology marks an epoch because it attempts to solve the problem of mind from the lower side, as distinguished from explanations of the soul in definite relation to God. Spinoza's logical systematization of the emotions places him in rank as one of the early psychologists. He is a follower of Descartes in many instances. He examines in detail the relations between psychical and physical processes. The mind is<sup>2</sup> part of the infinite intellect of God; and when the statement is made that it perceives this or that, it is affirmed that God has this or that idea, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is manifested through the nature of the human mind, or constitutes the essence of the human mind. The mind is the idea of the body, *i. e.*, the correlate in thought of body in extension. His definition of emotion is as follows:

"Emotion,<sup>3</sup> which is called passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence, greater or less than before and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another." The soul is defined as "thought" or a succession of ideas, or the sum of ideas; the ego does not exist, the relation of the soul to God is impersonal. The mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived either under the attributes of thought or extension. We do not know how mind acts on the body, but every sensation answers to a bodily condition. The soul can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past except while the body exists; it is not only immortal but external. This in brief represents Spinoza's main ideas in regard to the soul, a little in advance of those of Descartes.

Hume<sup>4</sup> followed the views of Berkeley, except in regard to a sepa-

<sup>1</sup> Locke: Human Understanding, II, xxvii, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ethics, II, 11 cor.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: part III, prop. I.

<sup>4</sup> Bain: Mental Science, p. 205.

rate soul or spirit. By some he is regarded as the founder of association psychology. All notions that express relations of necessity, all supposed cognitions formed on the basis of connections between things, rest, ultimately on the association of ideas. Following Berkeley, he claims that substance is unknown to us—we have no perfect idea of anything but a perception—that is different from substance. If the self<sup>1</sup> or ego existed it would be substantial, hence known. It is nothing but a complex of swiftly succeeding ideas, beneath which an imaginary substrate is supposed to exist named the soul, this latter is an illusion. "It is like a stage, across which feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and volitions are passing while itself does not come into sight." The soul being a complex we cannot truly speak of its immortality. To gain an idea of the psychological aspect of the soul it is necessary to give the leading thoughts of psychologists at different periods, but in this study only a comparatively small number of such can be considered. The one change that has taken place dating from late mediæval times is the gradual release of psychology from the realms, first of theology and later of philosophy, and the tendency more and more to attack the problems from the standpoint of experience and experimental data. The mental content is not considered alone from the standpoint of *a priori* analysis, but, having some knowledge of the sense organs, furnished by a growing knowledge of the body and the development of physiology, the problem is attacked from its lower side, as distinct from the theological view. This method of studying the soul aspects has tended to separate it entirely from its direct relations to God, which it earlier sustained, and identify it with mental processes entirely.

In Germany the release of psychology from the dominance of philosophical systems has taken place more slowly than in other countries. Thus while Kant has rendered a great service in pointing out the lines for an exact study of psychology, he is known better as a philosopher. In his teachings he denied the existence of the soul as a substantial entity that could be known, and the self as object could only be inferred. Using his own expression:

"There<sup>2</sup> does not then exist any rational psychology as a *doctrine* furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a *discipline*, which sets impassible limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of baseless spiritualism. It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this our human, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves— which though applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life. . . . The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition." The unity is one in thought, by which no object is given, and to which the category of substance, which always pre-supposes a given intuition, cannot be applied.

In internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of one's thought. The self or soul which we posit back of internal phenomena, is a mere idea, the object of which may be thought as substance, but no intuition can be given, so cannot be

<sup>1</sup> Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, Sect. V.

<sup>2</sup> Meiklejohn: Transcend. Dialectic. Book II, chap. I.

known. The subject can never be predicate, and we err when we so arrange it. Empirical psychology is the open road along which to extend our knowledge of the mental life. In brief Kant regarded the soul as an inference. In England the association psychology was early developed. As a representative of this school, J. S. Mill may be taken, although representatives might be selected who state the doctrines of the school equally well. "If<sup>1</sup> we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings; or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The opposition of the ego and non-ego, subject and object, spirit and matter, reduces itself to the opposition of sensation considered subjectively and sensation considered objectively." Matter is the permanent possibility of sensation. Our notion of mind is that of something permanent—opposed to the perpetual flux of the states of consciousness, this "permanent" for mind as well as for matter may be only a possibility. Our idea<sup>2</sup> of mind is reduced to nothing more than the idea of a series of actual sensations, and of the infinite possibilities of sensations which may realize themselves under appropriate conditions. The view of mind as a succession of states, an association of ideas, does not invalidate the idea of immortality. "It<sup>3</sup> is as easy to conceive of a succession of sentiments, a thread of consciousness eternally prolonged, as of a spiritual substance which always continues to exist," any arguments in proof are as applicable to the one as the other. This view need have no deleterious effect on one's idea of God. If the Divine Spirit be considered as a series of Divine thoughts (since we infer the Divine nature from the human), prolonged during eternity, then the existence of God is assumed to be as real as one's self.

Coming to more modern writers in Germany, we note the views of Herbart. The<sup>4</sup> soul is a simple substance not only without parts but with no plurality whatever in its quality. The ego is not a unit but a plurality. It is the junction of a series of representations, and is constantly changing its place. It is the result of their combination, their union in a single substance being necessary. It is an unchangeable real<sup>5</sup> and enters into various relations with other reals still conserving its identity. The soul originally was not a representative force, but it became such because it was stimulated to self conservation by other beings. It has its seat in the brain. The simplest representatives are sensations; they serve as symbols of the disturbing reals, and may disappear from consciousness, but not from the soul. For Lotze<sup>6</sup> we may note the following: The co-operation of physical forces is not sufficient to explain the unity which characterizes psychical life, material events of external life cannot cause ready-made sensations or ideas, they can only give signals which the soul must translate into its own language and conversely inner states of the soul are only the occasions for the activity of material organs. The material organs prepare and supply the material for the soul, and on these it exercises its force, thus working in the interest of higher spiritual activities. When the material is given the higher spiritual activities of the soul come into play themselves. Given the different psychical

<sup>1</sup> John S. Mills' *Hamilton's Phil.*, p. 212.

<sup>2</sup> Ribot: *English Psychology*, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> Ribot: *English Psychology*, p. 119.

<sup>4</sup> *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, part 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ribot: *German Psy. of To-day*, pp. 24-67.

<sup>6</sup> *Microcosmus*, I, 163-180; II, 135-143.

phenomena, presentation or ideas, these react on the soul and feeling is set free, reactions from feeling on the soul sets free expressions of the will. In the *Microcosmus* Lotze observes: "The soul neither comes fortuitously to this or that particular body, nor does the body create the soul by its organization; rather are souls a creation of the Infinite, who in this creation, proceeds by a self-given law. Our personality is not, however, compounded of body and soul; rather does our true essence lie exclusively in the soul, and the body is but the most intimately affianced part of the external world, which a higher power has given us as exclusively our own." The spirit is something higher than the soul. In the Spirit is the unity of our being, our true Ego. The soul is but an element in its service. At death the soul passes away, the spirit ripens to a new existence. We turn now in a brief review to the ideas of recent writers.

Recent views of psychology are of much wider scope, wider in the sense that the psychologist is awakening to the fact that, from the empirical standpoint any contribution to the history of the mental development of the race is of great value but it has a wider significance in that it includes careful studies of many forms of animal life as well.

These contribute to an understanding of the development of the mental life. The effort of psychology to free itself especially from metaphysical nomenclature has given rise in recent times to the "new" psychology, a so-called psychology established on a scientific basis and one in many instances without a "soul." Not without a soul in some sense of the word, however, but in it an endeavor is made to avoid the use of the word, and much that it has implied in the past. If there is reference to the soul as has been noted in this section it is, in many instances, prefaced by a limitation of the use of the word. The following modern views are given in brief:

For Wundt: "So long as one considers the soul as an independent atomic whole they are able to grant it an independent existence along with the body, but when we let that metaphysical hypothesis fall, and turn to experience, observation gives us a group of functions, united with definite psychic processes. This latter view grants no independent existence either within or without the body, but we must connect and represent it as unchangeable except with the changes of the bodily existence."—*Menschen und Thirseeelen*, Vol. II, p. 436.

Lewes thus defines his position:

"Together with the present sensation there is always a more or less complex group of revived sensations. . . . The term soul is the personification of this complex of present and revived feelings, and is the substratum of consciousness (in the general sense), all the particular feelings being its states."—*Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 414.

For Porter:

Since the time of Descartes "in all the varieties of psychological and physiological theories, those who have held the soul to be spiritual and immortal have almost uniformly and unanimously held that the agent of knowledge and feeling is distinct in essence from the principle of life. G. E. Stahl (1660-1734) 'maintained that the soul was active in the formation and functional processes of the body, as well as in the exercise of the conscious activities,' but he connected with this theory certain extreme doctrines which seemed to be inconsistent with its spirituality and independence of matter, as well as with the plainest facts of experience. Physiology of recent times thus developed, also psychology, favors a theory intermediate between that of Descartes and Stahl, the identity of the vital and spiritual forces. Thus the force or agent which at first originates the bodily organism, and actuates

its functions, at last manifests itself as the soul, in higher forms of activity, viz., knowledges, feeling, will. The principle of life and of psychical activity is one. Vital phenomena precede the psychical. The energy of the two are proportional, consciousness depends upon unconscious activities. Soul is adapted to the body and acts on matter yet the body is moulded by the soul and manifests it.—Human Intellect, pp. 36-40

Everybody accepts the truth that his soul exists and that it is an immediate substance. The principle that we call soul has the quality of consciousness or self-consciousness; consequently it is an absolute unity, since the substance of its being is extended and divisible it cannot be material.—Dessoir: *Geschichte der Neuer Deutschen Psychologie*, pp. 151-152.

The following quotations may be given:

"The soul, then, for us is simply our immediate experience, which we take as belonging to a thing that has past and future, in a way just analogous to that in which we construct anything in space and give it identity. We trace our soul backward, and construct it from our given experience. . . . This, then, is the picture of a soul which I have tried to suggest; not a ready-made machine working on certain material, but a growth of material more like a process of crystallization, the material moulding itself according to its own affinities and cohesions."—Bosanquet: *Psychol. of the Moral Self*, pp. 7-9.

For us the soul is a natural force. It stands in a natural relationship to the body but is not corporeal. It is to be distinguished from blind force as expressed in matter.—Schultze: *Vergleichende Seelenkunde*, p. 136.

"Psychology is the science of the mind. Instead of appealing to forces that work mysteriously, we can now, since 'soul' has been severed from the material world, introduce a purely mechanical explanation of nature. . . . No one can deny that there are sensations and ideas, feelings and decisions; and in saying that psychology is the science of the mind, we mean by mind, to begin with, nothing more than the sum of all these inner experiences. . . . Concerning the inner relation between mind and matter, we teach nothing; we suppose only that one being works in both."—Höfding: *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 67.

Sully observes that psychology as a science of mind, "does not discuss the question of the ultimate nature of spiritual activity, or the substance of mind, and the related question of the immortality of the soul." These it hands over to the branch of philosophy known as Rational or Inferential psychology.—*The Human Mind*, Vol. I, p. 4.

"Psychology may be defined as the science of mental processes. . . . Ideas, feelings, impulses, etc., experienced by me during my life constitute my 'mind.' Mind as used in every-day conversation means much more than this; it means something 'immaterial' or 'spiritual.' . . . It means a something which lies behind the particular manifestation of our mental life, just as the thing seems to lie behind the attributes of the thing. Looked at in this way, however, the term 'mind' takes on metaphysical implications, and therefore has no place in psychology.—Titchener: *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 5, 9.

"Subjective' or 'subjectified' processes, facts of 'consciousness,' 'psychical' or 'mental' states will mean for us no more than this—that part or aspect of the experiential fact which is dependent upon the experiencing individual . . . and 'consciousness' itself or 'mind' will in our terminology merely denote the sum total of all these particular phenomena. We shall nowhere discuss anything like a 'transcendental consciousness,' a 'substantial soul,' or an immaterial spirit."—Külpe: *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 3.

There is an involuntary movement of the mind; this movement is according to a necessary law and implies a nature. "The laws of logic are as necessary, to say the least, as that of gravitation. So, also, in the laws of sensibility, when the considerations are given; and in the various combinations of Intellect and feeling, including animal wants and passions. The force which produces these necessitated movements, is other than that which builds up the physical organization. With modifications it is common to all sensitive and perceptive life, to the animals as well as to us, and though the word has often a different and higher meaning, may be called the Soul.—Hopkins: Outline Study of Man, p. 253.

"By the *mind* or *soul* is meant the thinking principle, that by which I feel, know, and will, and by which my body is animated."

"*Mind* designates the animating principle as the subject of consciousness, while soul refers to it as the root of all forms of vital activity. Spirit is of still narrower extension than mind, indicating properly a being capable of the *higher, rational, or intellectual* order of conscious life."—Michael Maher, S. J.: Catholic Philosophy-Psychology, p. 1.

"We do not need a soul separate from our every-day mind, any more than we need two bodies,—one reserved for the State occasions of life. Conscience and ideals must be willing to come close to homely things, must live in touch with our commonest acts, or they may as well be wanting. So that in making no separation of the soul from our most familiar processes, psychology will do the spiritual life no harm."—Stratton: Experimental Psychology and Culture, p. 306.

We have presented the ideas of a number of writers on the subject. What can we gather from a survey of them? If we begin with Descartes, we observe that his mechanical consideration of animal life reduced the number of souls, by refusing to grant that animals have such and recognizing them only in the human race. He did not regard the subject of psychology as a study of mind *per se*, but in order to something else. The dominant interest was not one of psychological analysis. As Ribot<sup>1</sup> observes during the seventeenth century the science of the soul was called metaphysics. Beginning with Bacon and including Hobbes, Locke, Hume and others, the English school in general, the soul was relegated to the field of theology, mind alone being discussed. Locke did much to establish psychology by beginning with his *tabula rasa*. This was like starting from the opposite pole. In Germany the influence of philosophy existed for a longer time; the effect of this can be noted from the ideas expressed. There was a gradual tendency to narrow the view of mind or soul, and a passage to more abstract principles. For example, from analyses we have it reduced to a "a series of feelings," or a "complex of sense and apperception," or identical with "vital force," or the "sum of inner experiences," or a "series of mental processes," etc. These are the results of mental analyses. Such a course of events in psychology—following out the line of analysis, has served a useful purpose.

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<sup>1</sup> English Psychology, p. 23.

But the ground has been trodden over so much since the time of Kant that instead of analysis it might be better now to reverse the process, and take a constructive view of mind. It has been demonstrated from the results obtained that mental analysis is no longer a field productive of new material. Since evolution has become an established fact, psychology has not yet had time to fully adjust itself to a system that regards life as a serial whole. The entire animal series with man at its head becomes a field for mental research, and instead of depending on analysis alone, or even a study of mental development in the child, psychic manifestations can be noted all along this series, which, when correlated with the development of mind as it begins in the infant, gives us a field for constructive work. This is the meaning of genetic psychology. In this field several stages of the development of mental life can be recognized, or we may designate them as so many phases or view-points of the soul. Genetic psychology is really the "new psychology." Organic life at every stage manifests psychic elements, or possess certain psychic correlates; and psychology as a study is forming itself into a series that in some way parallels organic evolution. This is the newer picture we wish to present and from this point of view, from constructive elements, to observe some of the different ideas of soul. Dr. G. Stanley Hall is responsible more than any one else in this country for the setting of psychology in its proper relation to evolution as the term is now generally understood.

First we have what from the standpoint of the animal may be termed the biological soul. Porter recognized vital force as fundamental, this force, the principle of life, later develops, becoming synonymous with the soul or psyche. Külpe's classification recognizes this stage, and a more complete treatment from this standpoint is worked out by Ward<sup>1</sup> and Cope.<sup>2</sup> Under this head falls the totality of push upward as identified by Aristotle, also Schopenhauer's will to live.

The soul thus becomes co-extensive with life itself. Extinct species represent the loss of so much of the psyche. Since the dead far exceed the living thus far so much is lost and non-producible. A study of soul from this point of view must be purely objective. Comparison is a valuable aid. The vegetative, nutrient part of the soul is one of epi-phenomenon. Extreme plasticity is herein presupposed, corresponding in many respects to the protoplasm itself.

The species may be regarded as a type of soul. This may be termed the phyletic or race soul. For classification Jaëger's<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Psychic Factors of Civilization.

<sup>2</sup> Primary Factors of Organic Evolution.

<sup>3</sup> *Entdeckung der Seele.*

view of animal life may be taken. He regarded every individual as possessed of a specific type or quality of soul, and the species manifest this quality as distinct from other species, far more sharply than any single individual. The revelations of the soul of any species are (1) the characteristic odors emitted, by means of which, any species may be identified from related ones; (2) taste, a mark revealing itself in the flesh, and by means of which the specie may be identified. While these marks of distinction may be of little significance every distinct species of higher animal life are to a certain extent typified by traits of character. These distinct traits of character coalesce in the life of the human individual. The phylectic soul represents a differentiation of the biological soul, it is far more limited. It is adapted to certain sets of conditions only. Each species may be regarded as representing a quality of the psychic whole finding its culmination in man.

A third view is that of the individual soul. This is the type represented in the writings of Royce,<sup>1</sup> Schiller,<sup>2</sup> and others. It is a special form of the phylectic soul and is the result of heredity. In this view much that is pre-existent determines the character of the soul. It includes the vitality of the individual.

A fourth view may be regarded as that of personal consciousness. This is our own experience. It is the sum total of conscious reactions. It is that part of the psyche that is dealt with most largely by philosophy. It is represented by some as based on memory, pleasure and pain, or is merely a group of sensations, etc. It is composed largely of volitional experiences. Its origin may be said to be the "hedonic threshold."

A fifth and last view is that of attention; this is the narrowest and represents merely a cross-section of the present moment. Here consciousness comes to a focus. For Herbart it is the unity of apperception, and might be so regarded for Wundt. As the focal point shifts over the experiential, psychic elements of the soul, the attention may be now one and now another element.

In this view of the psyche as a product of evolution, the object of genetic psychology is to trace the relation between these aspects of soul. Soul life is homogeneous throughout the animal series, that of man the highest product. To understand what is meant by the human soul we must refer back to those lower levels and get a larger view of what experience means.

From an outline like the above we get a picture of the evolving soul-life. As different from analytic psychology of the past it represents<sup>3</sup> a change of study from subjective to objective

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<sup>1</sup> The World and the Individual, part II.

<sup>2</sup> The Riddle and the Sphinx.

<sup>3</sup> Ward: The Psychic Factors of Civilization, p. 125.

psychology, from feelings to intellect. From this manner of viewing soul we can only describe what phenomena it presents, but we cannot define it.

STUDIES OF THE SOUL BASED ON DATA COLLECTED BY  
MEANS OF A QUESTIONNAIRE.

A series of questions,<sup>1</sup> the answers to which would imply certain definitions of the soul, was sent out to a number of people for the purpose of ascertaining present ideas. In reply to these questions 124 returns were received, 64 males and 60 females. The ages of those replying vary from eight to sixty. The aim was to make the investigation as inclusive as possible,—the answers embody reports from persons educated in the public schools, and all grades to the degree of doctor of philosophy. About three-fourths of the returns, however, are from college students.

The data is suggestive rather than conclusive on any point.

One question to which a number of replies have been received was:

"What experiences led you to think of the soul the first time?"

Of those who made reply to this question the following answers were received:

Parental teaching, 5 males and 5 females; Sunday school or church, 6 males and 1 female; Revival meeting, 2 males and 1 female; teachings of the Bible, 1 male; influence of other persons, 3 males and 1 female; thought of death, 1 male and 2 females; a picture of material hell, 1 female; consciousness of wrong doing, 1 male.

M., 23. "I saw the trees and earth, they did not move as I did, were apparently insensible to heat and cold, and to bruises, and did not think. Here I caught a glimpse of the soul that makes us human."

These are reminiscent ideas and bear out the testimony of Dr. Street's study that the individual first comes to know of his soul as something in relation to psychic activities. The results of Dr. Street opposed the theory of innate ideas, and led to the conclusion that the soul is the product of the psychic activities of man himself.

Of present experiences that lead to thoughts of the soul, the following may be taken as typical:

F., 22. When I think of the purpose of life.

F., 24. Experiences of every-day life.

M., 34. Moral responsibility.

M., 39. Moral responsibility.

M., 21. Religious discussions and studies in psychology.

M., 22. "Thoughts of eternity and poetry touching on soul or some such subject."

F., 26. Death, also contemplation of any beauty or wonder in nature. Any experience that arouses highest thoughts and emotions.

F., 43. "Anything that brings up religion or psychology."

F., 23. Philosophical or psychological reading, church service, sermons, or death of a friend.

F., 28. Reading and observing development of character.

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<sup>1</sup>Studies involving partly the same line of investigation will be found in the *American Jour. of Psy.*, Vol. IX, pp. 350-395. The *Early Sense of Self*, by Dr. Hall. *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. VI, pp. 267-313. A *Genetic Study of Immortality*, by Dr. Street.

F., 22. Is led to think of the soul "when touched by something grand in music, art, nature, or human character," also by any moral victory in her own life.

M., 21. Conscience.

M., 22. Any religious address or religious thought.

F., 20. Death of a friend or acquaintance; reading or hearing of spiritualism.

M., 42. Work as a minister, funerals. Also studies in psychology and sociology.

M., 31. "The rising and setting of the sun, birth and death of day; also death of a fellow being."

F., 29. "Sitting by the bedside of a dying patient."

M., 20. "Experiences where my life is concerned or after pleasure and amid solitude."

M. "Sad rather than joyful experiences are apt to lead me to think of it."

M., 19. "Any moral or ethical idea or question, which on reasoning back towards its ultimate origin involves a consideration of the soul."

M., 27. "Observation of the wonders of nature, and man whose capabilities are infinite, standing at the head of creation."

M., 20. "The reading of books on morals, a study of the Bible, listening to sermons. The presence of sickness, sadness, trouble, etc.

M., 23. "I think of the soul to-day when my attention is called to some of life's subjective phases,—anguish, prayer, love, music, art,—these things bore straight through the objective world and we know that there is something which we term the soul for convenience."

M., 27. "Feeling that *I am I*, a thinker, feeler, doer; an immaterial, spaceless, invisible, energizing somewhat, wholly different from the sensations conveyed through the bodily organs."

M., 25. "I am most frequently led to think of it when meditating upon some kindness, friendship, and love; in connection with or when beholding something beautiful, wonderful, or mysterious; and when a friend or some one of interest dies."

M., 47. "Anything that strongly suggests the self-interest in life and my relations to the world of 'others.'"

In noting these considerations one comes to the conclusion that those replying have something in mind, when they speak of the soul, that is not implied in the teaching of psychology, even though they have studied the subject as many of them have. Their ideas are testimony of religious teachings, or of the *feeling* of moral responsibility, or they refer to sentiments or emotion of some kind that affect one deeply; early religious training, and all that it implies has been stamped too deeply to be replaced by the results of analysis. It is as though the education of the intellect after all is merely on the surface and the feelings are immeasurably larger than cognition. The idea conveyed in many of these replies, more plainly shown than in the definitions given, is that of a something, existing, of some kind, that can be touched by emotions of sadness, beauty, wonder, love, music, etc., these things relate to the soul as they understand it because they call it to mind.

The number of definite answers received in reply to the question as to what age they first thought of the soul, would not justify any conclusion, but the age seems to vary from three years (in two instances) to eight or nine.

Material idea of soul. Of those who at some time thought the soul to be something material, 34 males and 36 females made reply.

Seven males and eight females thought it was made of *human flesh*.

Six males and three females thought it was made of some light, *transparent* material.

Three males and six females thought it was *mist, cloud* or *air*.

One male and three females thought it some *substance*, hard or soft.  
As to how it was identified:

Three males and one female thought the soul was identical with, or similar to, the *body*.

Five males and two females thought it some *part* of the *body*.

Three males and one female thought it was some *organ* of the *body*.

Three males and three females thought the soul to be identical with, or similar to, the *heart*.

One male thought it was the *brain*.

One female thought it was the *breath*.

Four males and two females thought it was an invisible *being*, developing in the *body*.

Four males and two females called it an *angel*.

Three males and five females identified the soul with *mist, cloud* or *air*.

Three females thought it was an indescribable *mass* of something.

One female thought the soul was a little *flame*.

One female " " " " white *butterfly*.

One female " " " " small, white *dove*.

One female " " " " *something* with *wings*.

One male " " " " a small, *airy object*, pointed.

As to shape:

Nine males and six females thought the soul had the form of the *human body*.

One female thought it was like "a dim, white, *flat surface*."

One female thought the soul shaped like the *sole* of a *shoe*.

One female thought of it as a vague *shadowy outline*.

One female thought it took the form of *two oysters*, side by side, and connected at the top.

Two females conceived of the soul as *oval* in shape.

One female thought it was *round*.

As to material, shape, form, etc., of childish views, the data only strengthens that already collected,<sup>1</sup> and as has been suggested<sup>2</sup> these views of children parallel the notions of primitive man. This parallelism is brought out very forcibly if a comparison of these reminiscent views be made with the studies I have collected on primitive notions of the soul. All those replying, sometime during their childhood had thought of the soul; in most cases they were able to give the instance in which the idea was first brought to mind. The picture of heaven,—the dwelling place of the soul—a description usually very beautiful to the mind of the child takes firm root. With this idea of heaven, as the place where the good souls dwell, and from which the bad ones are shut out—the child associates at once the idea of the soul as that part of the person surviving death; this picture and all that it implies to the child becomes very precious to him. He likes to talk about heaven, to learn all he can about it because he may dwell there sometime, the soul thus becomes something that must be cared for, at the same time, however, the childish imagination, unable to think of this part of his nature, associates it with some material object.

As to the age when the change of ideas takes place, only those stating positively were selected. To this question, 13 males and 7 females replied.

Between 10 and 12—Five females and two males.

" 12 " 15—Three females and three males.

<sup>1</sup>Dr. Hall: *op. loc.*, p. 372.

<sup>2</sup>Street: *op. loc.*, p. 277.

Between 15 and 20—Six males.

“ 20 “ 25—One male and one female.

“ 30 “ 40—One male.

This point has been brought out more forcibly in Street's returns, since he had a larger amount of data than is here given. In nearly every case of adult experience a change occurring during the adolescent period was noted, yet only those stating definitely the age when the change occurred have been selected.

Where the soul is located.

Those who have at any time fancied, or who now fancy, the soul as located, within or without the body, replied as follows:

In the brain, four males and six females; in the head, five males and two females; in or near the heart, eight males and thirteen females; in the breast or lungs, two males and three females; in the entire body, two males; in the trunk somewhere, one male; anywhere above the diaphragm, one female; around the head and trunk (as a vaporous substance), one male; exterior to, but near the body, one female; in the sky, one female.

Anything about which we think relates itself to something else; this association has led to the location of the soul. And this leads again to the connection of soul and body. The views selected are not reminiscent, but present ideas. The following are selected:

F., 28. "A spirituality dwelling in the physical body throughout."

M., 42. "I think of the soul as dwelling in the body, as permeating the whole body as a spiritual substance."

M., —. "Like perfume about a rose."

M., —. Thinks of it as permeating the body.

F., —. Thinks it pervades every fiber.

M., 40. Thinks "concomitance partly commends itself."

F., 43. Likens connection between soul and body to "electricity and the machine it runs through."

F., 23. "I think of it as diffused more or less over me."

F., —. Thinks the soul is encased somewhere in the body.

M., 19. "I fancy the soul as residing in the head in connection with the brain."

M., 19. "I fancy the soul as connected with the whole and entire body, with its centres in the heart and in conscience."

M., 21. "I have fancied that the body is a 'vessel' or the medium through which the mind has its expression and being."

F., 26. Sometimes fancies the soul as a distinct, separable something lodged in the body during its earthly career.

F., 23. Used to fancy the soul "connected with the body much as the works of a watch are in the watch case."

F., —. Used to fancy the soul "floated about in the body."

M., 20. "I think it is in the body or just something that is merely association with it."

M., 21. Thinks of the soul "as part of, perhaps combining the higher and nobler qualities," of a person.

M., 27. "I fancy that the soul has merely a temporary home in the body. I have always thought of each as being separate, and as going together for a purpose."

M., 26. "I now think the soul connected with the body as the mind; perhaps they are the same."

M., 47. Thinks the soul and body are inseparable, that is, "They never existed apart."

Any boundaries marking off psychology from philosophy are at once transcended by many of the above ideas which suggest discussions of scholastic times. They are further suggestive of the idea that religion with which the soul is associated, as can be seen from many of the

citations, is a separate field from that of philosophy, and of the two types, the influences that affect the religious man are more general and appeal to the masses of people; while those affecting the philosopher are more specialized.

As to the origin of the soul, sixteen males and thirteen females replied.

Nine males and four females believe that the soul comes to the body at birth; four males and four females, with the beginning of the life of the body. Two males think the soul is wrapped up in the embryo. One male thinks the soul does not come until the child's mind is capable of real thought; and one female thinks it comes with the awakening of consciousness.

These ideas are suggestive although they differ as to the period of the child's life when the soul is supposed to enter the body. In Dr. Hall's splendid study<sup>1</sup> the soul unfolds and develops from the materials of its environment. Baldwin<sup>2</sup> attempts to trace the social development of the self—the stages of its growth as they are formed—from contact with other persons. Street observes that the growth of the soul parallels the growth of the body. As will be noted from the answers most of them merely refer to the time of the inception of the soul.

Reminiscent ideas. As to how the earliest impressions were regarded and some description of these, the following may be taken as examples:

F., 20. "My earliest notion of the soul was as a part of my body. I thought it was a part just over my lungs and heart, and that in death the angels came and took this away, and flew with it to heaven."

F., 22. "Probably about 7 years old I associated it with my body, an inner organ, near to or the same as my heart. It was white when I was good, and spotted when I was bad. Later I thought of it as an angel with white wings."

M., 21. "I thought of the soul as an object, where it was situated I do not know only it was in the trunk somewhere. I thought of it as a small airy object, pointed, and I thought that after death some way or other it got out of the body and in some way escaped out of the house and then went directly to heaven. How it now assumed shape and lived I could never make myself understand."

F., 19. "My earliest notion of the soul was of its shape rather than of what it really is. I saw an indescribable mass, light gray in color, something the shape of an egg, more oblong than round; but it seemed as if this at times changed its shape, according to the moods the possessor was in towards God. For I conceived the soul to be nearer to the Almighty than any other part of the body and more closely directly concerned with God. From something connected with one of my earliest physiology lessons, I got the idea that the soul was located near the heart, in the central part of the body."

F., 20. "I thought the soul was of the same shape as the body until my tenth year. I thought it was encased somewhere in the body."

F., 22. "My earliest notion of the soul was that it was a misty, vaporous form, intangible, and yet never breaking into pieces or flying off into atoms like vapor; it was located somewhere near the apex of the heart, but escaped at death, and, changing its form, as a volume of smoke does, it gently and slowly found its way, in a direct line, to the home where it was always to remain, after taking a human form though not a human body."

F., 20. "I was four or five years old. I thought of it then only be-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Social and Ethical Interpretations.

cause I heard people speak of it. I never had a clear idea of what it was. It seemed like a white, thin cloud mass.

"The form seemed the same as the sole of a shoe. About four years old. I never thought of it as located, it floated about in my body."

M., 23. "I was probably 8 or 10 years old when I first thought of the soul. At first I saw it in form of an angel, probably caused by seeing the pictures of angels."

F., 43. "At the age of 8, I thought it was similar to my body and by putting this off the soul would be revealed and that its beauty or ugliness depended upon my thoughts and actions.

"I thought that God made souls and put them into bodies in a very material fashion, very much as yeast might be kneaded into bread."

M., 26. "About 12 years. I thought some kind of organ indescribable located in or about the heart. I used to think the heart of man was the soul, and that the heart would never die nor could it be destroyed. This view was also strengthened by the fact that the hearts of animals are so hard to cook or burn to ashes."

To one who studies the reminiscent returns of early childhood, there is something akin to sacredness in the simplicity of the views expressed. The child-like faith has accepted all these pictures which involve the survival of the soul and with which it is associated. Such thoughts as these, with others stating similar temporal ideas and offering promise to the child, form the hope of its early life. They are events to which it looks forward. During past ages such pictures have been the hope of the race, just as the savage looks forward to the happy hunting ground. Who can tell how much they have promoted the development of humanity?

They are the elements forming much of the early mental food of the child. Not much depends on the method of teaching these beliefs, but if they are omitted are we not withholding from the child things it demands? Shall we teach them? Shall we teach the child things that have to be corrected later? With reference to the soul, heaven, etc., most people would say "yes." If, as for Herbart, Interest is the dominant thing—then myth and all the folk-tales dear to child life have their place, while if we follow the sometimes too utilitarian idea of attempting to teach nothing that will have to be untaught, some of the things for which the child-mind may hunger will be omitted. There is good soil in the mental life of the child for flights of the imagination based on ideas connected with the soul, in fact he pictures another world with its inhabitants, the ideas take firm root, and they are so vivid that in most cases they are remembered until old age. Adolescent views of the soul may be gathered from the following:

F., 43. "'Childish notion' replaced by an idea of soul as an immaterial thing, yet still resembling the material *me*."

M., 40. "At 12 or 13 years of age thought the soul 'an immortal something, parallel with the mind.' 'An abstraction.'"

M., 26. "Yes. My idea about the soul is different now. At one period of my life—from 16 to 20—I thought the soul separate from the mind."

M., 19. "At about 12 I began to think of the soul as being immortal, and not made of material substance."

M., 19. "I thought the soul had a human form when about the age of 13 or 14. The form was exactly that of the human body."

M., 23. "Of late years my idea of soul has changed. I have never studied the soul much, but about 12 or 15 years of age I began to consider the soul as something without form that dwelled in the body. When considered that the body decayed I could not think of the soul having form."

F., 24. "Yes. I thought it was a small round something—I was then about 13 or 14 years of age."

M., 21. "About 14. Thought it was an essence."

The opinion now generally held of the expansion of the mind at the beginning of the adolescent period is here illustrated. The old material ideas are cut loose from and new ones peculiarly individual are formed. The character of these changes have been brought out in some of their different phases of late,—especially former studies here at Clark University. While, as was noted above, only twenty stated definitely the time when their ideas changed, many more stated, indefinitely, the time as falling within the adolescent period. Several speak of the change as being to one of an abstract or immaterial substance of some kind. This they have gained largely from three sources,—conversation, reading, and their own thinking. Judging, however, from the replies, conversation and individual thought play the larger part. The study of psychology is claimed by some as the cause of the change. From its effects one says, "Now I am entirely unsettled and have no definite notion or idea of the soul." Several claim that they are unable to define their position from recently studying this subject; the study of physiology, and the reading of different books, Cicero, Emerson, George Eliot, and other books are mentioned as influential. Of those not having college training the Bible is relied upon in most cases at the critical period. It is suggestive of the need of a special literature for this period,—and perhaps even for this subject.

The effect of psychology may more effectually destroy the early impression but the changes come without this, and there may be other studies that lead to worse effects than this.

Three negative replies were received. One of those answering had received only a common school education, one is by profession a dentist, the other while still a college student has spent two years in the study of medicine. The following extracts from their replies are given:

M., 43. Dentist:

"At what age did you first think of the soul?' When I was very ignorant of the laws of nature. 'What did you think it was?' I thought it was something which some infinite substance or being had injected or put into me to live and carry my identity after the death of the body in another world they call heaven. 'What did you think it was?' I thought it was the life of every one. 'What is your present idea of the soul?' My idea is that the substance or thing called force is usually called or thought to be the soul. I arrived at my conclusion by reading and thinking both—comparing ideas.

"In my natural and spontaneous thinking I have come to the conclusion that I know as little about the soul as Spencer and I do not care about a thing that I think no one knows anything or can know anything about. We can understand and know something about material things, then why should we bother ourselves with immaterial things?"

As to the future life: "I would prefer to sleep the dreamless sleep. I would like for every one to be as kind, good and forgiving to their fellow creatures as they possibly can and I would like, if there should be such a being as a *God*, for him, her or it, to be as kind and gentle as was Mr. Ingersoll, Voltaire, Paine and a host of others that I could mention."

M., 23. American; candidate for the degree of A. B., 1903, studied medicine two years. "At about the age of 16 I thought of the soul as existing and occupying space within the cranium. It seemed ethereal, without shape or mass. Later, I thought it to be something apart from my ordinary self, something more than human. Perhaps a fre-

quent recurrence of thoughts about the nature of God caused the change in my conception of the soul.

"At the present time I do not believe in the existence of the soul. I think that human life is the product of evolution and that in the beginning all life, both animal and vegetable, was the same, or that they had a common ancestor. All life manifests the power of growth and reproduction; the mere differentiation of function and the acquiring of powers of judgment, reason, etc., do not seem to me to warrant the belief in the existence of the soul. The law of the indestructibility of matter cannot be applied to the phenomena of life. The mind may be completely destroyed; mental processes cease when the body dies.

"If the soul exists in the human adult does it not also exist in the infant, in the embryo, in the original cell in which that particular being took his beginning? It is impossible for me to reason out such a state of affairs. If the soul is a fact, should not all life possess it?"

M., 28. Common schools. "I do not think I have a soul. What is commonly called the soul is that part of a human being which is supposed to exist and be immortal. What is called the soul is really the mind. Biblical teachings first led me to think of it. Daily observation and reflection leads me to think of it as a superstition with which a considerable portion of mankind is afflicted.

"I have never thought of the soul as having shape or form, but have considered it my emotions, which I can feel, and which can cause pain or gladness, bring out in my actions and words the good and bad. I now consider what is called the soul to be the emotions, a creature of the mind, the mind a creature of the brain and animal organism, a body. I do not think of the soul as existing anywhere, except in the imaginations and faith of a lot of people, who have no reason for believing in it other than they have been educated to believe in a thing they have never seen and no one else has seen. My conclusions are from my own thinking."

It will be observed that the first writer speaks of force, and from the men to whom he refers would probably be classed by orthodoxy as an infidel. The second is a thorough-going evolutionist and no doubt, as for many biologists, soul has no place, and mind itself is merely a product of matter. The third believes the soul to be the emotions, merely a product of the mind, *i. e.*, of the imagination, this the result of his own thinking. It has often been observed that the study of biology, or even a preparation for medicine, expands the somatic field and its importance and consequently contracts the psychic world.

The following returns are exemplary of what may be termed the theological view of the soul. The orthodox idea expressed by clergymen, and those strongly influenced by religious training to such an extent that they have not been much affected by any contradictory teaching. The following view is from a minister, a university graduate with theological training:

M., 39. "Yes—I *am* a soul or personal being; never say I *have* a soul. In childhood I thought my soul was a *part of me*. Later I came to use *soul* as identical with the *I*, the personal and moral self-consciousness.

"The question as to what it was made of did not occur to me. That childhood idea was evidently impressed on my mind from without. The changes that came as I met other views and criticisms of that view, and came to think somewhat independently, were rather in the line of development and filling in of detail than towards contrary views.

"My present idea is already stated. 'I *am* a soul,' *i. e.*, a self-conscious centre of personal activity with a sense of responsibility for

my deeds, words and thoughts. As such self-conscious centre of personal activity I expect to endure after the change of death. This view is the result of many factors in which my own thinking has largely had the function of passing in review, rejecting, or accepting, or combining elements from many sources. From 8 to 14 years of age I was surrounded by spiritualistic believers of the very highest type. At 15 I joined the Unitarian church. During my college course (at Bowdoin) I was brought under Congregational influence. In the University I became familiar with Oriental philosophies and religions as well as undergoing the usual theological discipline. I have also had some training in science and have a special knowledge of botany. In my thought the soul has a closer connection with the body in waking moments than in sleep, in intense work and feeling than in idleness, in health than in sickness. I am convinced that the soul may temporarily leave the body under certain conditions and return to it again.

"My imagination of the souls of dead people practically amounts to an indentity with their bodies; yet my intellect tells me that while a body,—*i. e.*, form and substance—may be necessary as a basis or accompaniment to personal self-consciousness it can never be its essence. Gross or ethereal it is not the body we mean when we say 'I' or 'He.' I imagine differences of form and feature, differences of knowledge, and differences of character between souls of the dead. Those who died many centuries ago would presumably differ from those recently dead by so much as the conditions to which they were subjected for so long a time differ from conditions here. It is a matter of pure imagination.

"I conceive souls to differ in themselves according as they have lived well or ill, to differ in capacity, outlook and attitude towards environment. The environment would presumably differ also to some extent, as differences in make-up would lead to different choices and different outside pressures just as under the conditions with which we are familiar."

F., 32. University graduate. "My ideas, I should say I derived from the teachings of others in the beginning. Next the knowledge I gained from books emphasized them. And since I have been capable of giving the subject any serious consideration I do not remember to have ever fancied the soul as having form. It always appealed to me as a mysterious, impalpable eternal power belonging to each creature and modified by the earthly actions of the creature.

"I am more thoroughly convinced of the soul's reality. The fact that we pass through all sorts of experiences while all the physical senses are at rest seems to me to prove that they are only vehicles, the real power is something outside and beyond. My ideas concerning the soul have not changed very decidedly. I believe that the capacity of our enjoyment of the future life will be the measure of our development of this life; and our suffering the same way. When I begin to speculate as to what eternity will be like I usually end with the thought that we are too much of the earth earthy to have any notion of it and am satisfied to leave it all with Him who knoweth best."

M., 54. Graduate of college and Theological Seminary. In answer to the questions replies:

"I am a soul. I habitually think of myself as an immortal being. Can't remember much about my early conceptions as to what the soul was, or what it was made of. Simply thought of it as something immaterial and other than the body. My ideas have not changed but are clearer and more definite. Study of the Bible, psychology and theology have gradually added to and enlarged my conceptions. I have tried

to conceive of the soul as having form and shape, or something corresponding to these as belonging to immaterial or spiritual entities. In my mind the spirit form corresponds to the material. This idea is the result of thought in later years. I think of the soul as in some sense occupying the whole physical tabernacle. Or I am a soul occupying my whole body, which though not essential to my conscious existence is necessary to my completeness.

"My present idea is that it is a simple, immaterial, substantial, sentient, intelligent entity, having what corresponds to local form, capable of moving from place to place, and naturally clothing itself in the material human form. I have derived this idea from books and my own thinking mainly. Most largely from the Bible,—such passages as I Cor. 15th Chapter; II Cor. 5; Rev. 20, etc.

"I have thought of the soul or spirit as dwelling in the whole body having some sort of a vital connection with the nervous, arterial and other systems of the body,—a connection, however, that is as yet incomprehensible. I think the soul was conceived in the womb with the body. I think it leaves the body when the vital connection with it is severed, and this is at the instant when the body may be pronounced as dead. 'The body without the spirit is dead.' The soul cannot sever its own vital connection with the body by any power of the will. But when some external force, like disease, or violence, or an accident or a shock, does sever that connection by intercepting the vital process, I conceive of the soul thus released as *ascending* from the body as if from a weight that had been holding it down. This idea may be instinctive or derived from scripture passages like Eccl. 3:21. I think of the soul as connected with the body as closely and inevitably at one time as at another, though the thoughts of the soul may have freer and wider range at some times than at others—as in dreams, visions, telepathic communion, etc. . . .

"The physical differences in bodies as to sex, age, culture, etc., suggest to me corresponding differences in the souls that occupied them, except as to mere physical infirmities and limitations. I regard the souls of those who died long ago substantially the same as those who died to-day.

"I conceive of the souls of the dead, especially of the 'dead in Christ,' as having larger physical and psychic powers, freer and more extended movement, greater knowledge, nobler disposition, etc., though as somehow suffering a limitation to be supplied by their glorified bodies. As to their own past, the righteous recognize God's mercies and praise him for them, while the wicked can only review it with wretchedness and remorse. I think they remember living friends and feel an interest in them, as the parable of the rich man and Lazarus teaches. And that they are conscious of the presence of each other, and feel mutual love and fellowship, or hatred and repulsion, according to character and condition. I think the righteous dead, though they are 'the spirits of just men made perfect,' are still capable of learning and developing."

The theological idea of the soul, as may be observed, is changing from what it has been in the past. Instead of the soul being regarded as something God creates and puts into the body, instead of observing that "I have a soul," the term "I am" is used. One minister says he used to regard the soul as something plus the body, but cannot now hold that view. The idea of an entity of some kind, having shape or form, is still preserved. Many persons, as is noted in the above, regard the soul as more closely connected with the body at some times than at others, especially during work and activity. As to future existence, the ideas have not changed greatly from those of the Patristic Fathers.

Psychological. The following notions show the influence of the teaching of psychology on early impressions and may be classified as psychological views as expressed by the average person. The extent of education is noted in each instance.

F. Normal school graduate. "Mind and soul mean the same to me now in one sense. Still my old spiritual idea of the soul as apart from intellect has never been quite lost. My childish notion regarding soul was the outcome of my own imagination simply."

M., 19. In college. "The age at which I first had any definite idea of the soul in my mind was between the years 6 and 10. After this first idea of the soul, which was in some way shaken and disfigured, my idea of the soul became much less definite. While in some ways my ideas remained unaltered, the form and abode of it were entirely undefined. This change came when I was about 12 years of age. And to say the truth during the past few years of my university life, and especially since studying psychology, I find my idea of the soul growing less and less definite as far as its separate existence is concerned, and becoming more and more involved in and co-existent with mind. As nearly as I can now define it, my conception of the soul is: an ethereal entity existing in the mind."

F. College student. "The soul is the sensations, perceptions, memories, etc., that live after death. It has no form, is something that cannot be seen. As to the location, I should say it is in the mind. This is the relation of mind to soul. I think the spirit and soul are the same."

M., 32. Doctor of philosophy, teacher of psychology. "I have almost lost the early notion and cannot definitely recall it. It has changed by imperceptible gradations into a present notion of *mind* (or soul—I use the terms interchangeably) which yet seems to flit from region to region of the brain with the stream of consciousness, always covering a considerable area. It no longer has the "foggy" appearance, and indeed is quite indescribable, but is confined to the *brain* and mainly at least to the brain cortex. The changes from the early notion have come almost wholly from my learning about the brain, and when I think of soul or mind at present there is always, I think, some image of *brains* that I have handled and seen in my study of neurology.

"I make no distinction, in my habit and thinking, between soul, mind, and spirit, except that soul seems a larger thing—to include the unconscious, temporarily forgotten part of the psyche. I suppose, too, that *spirit* keeps something of my old notion of it as a light airy something that *goes up* when we die—it has a more ghostly, quick-moving, time and space-transcending quality than either *mind* or *soul*. Probably my notion of the original meaning of the Latin *spiritus* has influenced this. Mind has long been largely synonymous with *intellect* with me, and I find it difficult to make it include the feelings, then, as a psychologist I have often argued for the use of 'mind' for the whole psyche.

"I have come more and more to think of mind or soul as the *fundamental* thing about the psycho-physical organism, and that mind constructs the body more than body produces mind. That is, heredity is a *psychic* rather than a *physical* matter, is memory. As the soul was itself, with but a *single cell*, as the body, so it may persist whenever adult body drops away in death, and may construct another body, possibly, when the environment becomes suitable for the purpose—a very different body, perhaps, suitable to a different environment.

"These are but *dreams* about the soul, but they describe a conception of it that goes with me now as the old 'gray vapor' image went with me as a child."

F., 43. Graduate of college and university. "I have thought of the soul, mind or self,—the name which I apply to it depends upon the connection; in a psychological discussion I should probably call it the self, the ego, the me, or the unifying principle of consciousness; in a religious connection I should be likely to use soul, and in ordinary conversation, mind. . . .

"I cannot remember definitely at what age I first thought of soul but I can, from external circumstances of which I know the date, state that I had definite ideas about it at the age of 8. I thought it was similar to my body, and by putting this off the soul would be revealed and that its beauty or ugliness depended upon my thoughts and actions. My ideas have changed from time to time but I cannot locate these changes in time. At the age of 12 I had outgrown the idea given above, but cannot tell when it happened or whether it was a growth too slow to be noticed. It was replaced by an idea of soul as an immaterial thing yet still resembling the material me.

"I have always thought of the soul as having shape or form as given above. I always used to think of the soul as located somewhere, usually in the sky. The tendency to do so is still present at times.

"My present idea of the soul is the unity underlying states of consciousness. It is probably derived from books, other people and thinking combined.

"The only thing to which I can liken my idea of the connection of soul and body is to electricity and the machine it runs, though that is a crude simile. At one time I thought of it as permeating the body like a gas but I cannot tell at what age I thought this. I see no reason why the soul should not begin when the body does, prenatally. I have never had any idea how it came since I lost the childish one that God made souls and put them into bodies in a very material fashion, very much as yeast might be kneaded into bread. It seems to me that the soul leaves the body when consciousness ceases. I suppose I think of it as floating off into space somewhere if I try to envisage it. The soul seems to me most closely connected with the body in full waking consciousness and greatest activity.

"I usually think of the soul as expressed in conscious states without envisaging any particular form. If I think of form at all it is a copy of the body but without material substance. I conceive souls as differing in development, therefore no two would be precisely alike, but apart from that I know of no difference that the time in which one lived would make.

"The only difference which I think of as existing between the souls of the dead and the living is the freedom from bodily limitations in time and space. With that freedom it seems to me that the past would be more clearly seen and differently viewed, and the affections stronger, purer and freed from selfishness. Under such conditions learning and improving seem the natural result."

Philosophical ideas. Classified as philosophical the extracts of the following may be given. Few of the returns indicate any philosophical system worked out.

F. College student. "My first idea of soul remained with me until I was about 10 years of age; then I began to reason with myself about it, and to listen to others talk of it. My original notion gradually faded, and for several years I had no notion whatever of it. Then, at about 15, I began to form my present notion: I believe the soul is an atom of the all-knowing, all-loving, all-creating power called God; that it always has existed in some form or other, and always will continue to exist. As the power creates, it infuses itself into its creatures, so that every living thing, plant and animal, contains a spark

of the fire which cannot be extinguished. Following out this plan, then, it is unjust that one of these sparks should be placed on earth as a poor, dumb earth-worm, while another is an intelligent, deep-minded human being. For this reason, I believe that every atom of Life-Power will be given the opportunity of completing its cycle; it began from the original Power, it will complete its development, and again return to the Power. I do not say that I believe in transmigration of the soul from the lower to the higher forms, or from animal to the human form: I have not settled this point to *my own* satisfaction, nor do I expect to do so. Nor can I reconcile the Life-Power in plants with that in man. But I *feel*, rather than *reason*, that such a soul exists in them.

"I think the soul is composed of two parts,—spirit and mind. I have never considered the spirit as different from the soul, excepting that it is the *Life* element; the mind is the intelligence element; the part that is developed and broadened during life; even the 'spiritual education' is only a higher, purer mindedness, and is mental. If the soul is immortal, as I firmly believe it is, then both spirit and mind exist after death, but the mind is not as *highly organized* as the spirit, if such a term could be applied to something which always was. The mind is largely under our own control,—its broadening and development or its entire neglect—and may be so infused with wrong ideas and notions that all we have spent a lifetime in learning will have to be unlearned hereafter. But there is no arbitrary phase of the spirit; it was and will be, and we can merely change its form by taking life."

M., 47. College and university. A teacher of mathematics but a student of philosophy.

"(b) The permanent '*I*.'

"(c) The same as the '*I*.'

"(d) They have grown in clearness and definiteness mainly as the result of increased knowledge of *self* as a knowing, willing and sentient being. There has been no *radical change of idea* in my experience of *self*. Only a development with increased knowledge and general experience.

"2. (a) Yes.

"(b) Certainly, I *am* one. (A soul.)

"(c) The same as to myself.

"4. (a) Yes, the form of the body. I have not to my knowledge ever dissociated the form of the soul from that of the body.

"5. (a) The soul is the permanent self.

"(b) Came to the body when the body came to it. They *never existed apart*. No soul without body. No body without soul.

"(c) At death the corpse is no longer a 'body.' Its functions have ceased. Both body and soul have left the corpse behind.

"(d) Body is body only in so far as it is organic to soul, therefore one may be permitted to say that the connection between soul and body is more apparent at one time than another, *e. g.*, waking than sleeping, action than inaction, etc., but I see no reason for regarding this distinction as final, since *visibility* and *externality* are not the true criteria of soul activity. The only criterion is permanence.

"Souls of the dead are of size and form of body in life, not subject to gravity; capable of penetrating all matter unobstructed, and transcending all limitations of time and place. I have conceived souls as retaining sex distinctions but only in an ideal sense. Children remain children with developed intelligence, but still retaining the naïve simplicity of the child. Cultured and ignorant remain relatively so.

"Yes, as the soul is the developed form of the '*Ego*,' it would naturally be different in different ages, as among different peoples and different individuals.

"In my early days of course the current theological dogmas as to rewards and punishments appealed to my imagination, though I cannot say that they ever satisfied my intellect. Now I think every soul carries into the hereafter the accumulated heritage from earth and will find its place in the further process of evolution according to its own choice and capacity. But I do not think we can judge the destiny of a soul by any time standard. Every soul is organic in a great purpose and can be judged only in reference to its service towards that end. Good and bad are largely relative to a time judgment and may have little significance relative to the real function of a soul as an organ in the world history.

"Well-doing can have meaning only in reference to environment. No soul exists apart from an environment. There is no absolute self.

"My ideal life, here and hereafter, is 'fitness for the place I occupy.' I hold this ideal in no fatalistic sense but in the conviction that man attains such perfection as is possible for him by filling well (*i. e.*, in good will) the place in which he finds himself."

Not all of the returns admitted of classification as here outlined. Most of them, strictly speaking, would fall into the theological group,—a small number might be classed as psychological and a smaller number as philosophical. But as a group, perhaps brought out by the questions, the replies all bear testimony that the writers of them have been influenced by religious training. If they may be taken as an index they show how lightly our instruction in psychology, the purpose it serves in life—compared with the vital question of theology—falls on the surface of the mental content. From the returns, the mind or the self, while they may be regarded as the equivalents of the term soul, have never commanded the thought or attention of those replying as has the soul; this can be easily observed from the language. If the psychologist desires to replace this word, unless there is a radical change in our methods of education, such an effect will not soon be changed. Current psychology has cast off the very term, the name of the very core about which it developed. A term in its early days considered so vital and so sacred that men have suffered anathema and ostracism for their adherence to opinions regarded as detrimental to society. In order that the student may understand how bitter and costly these disputes have been—what persons have suffered for daring to express an opinion, something in regard to the history of the term should be incorporated in our psychologies. We bespeak at least for modern psychology a chapter that will briefly state its history.

Many of the replies were from students engaged in the study of psychology, others, from psychologists at present teaching the subject. From the returns it would seem that soul and mind are in most cases identified, and yet like a double load they are trying to carry. The ideas are for the most part in harmony with current psychology, but when detailed explanations are required in regard to soul, they tend to fall in line with

theology. In details they do not adhere strictly to current psychology. This is no doubt due to the fact that students replying have not gone into the subject very deeply, *i. e.*, have not had sufficient time perhaps to master the text they may be using. Moreover, comparatively few students who elect the subjects of philosophy and psychology have the analytic turn of mind necessary to pursue the subjects for the pleasure derived from them long enough to thus become thorough-going psychologists.

*Summary.* The idea of a soul will continue to exist as long as the idea of an immortal being or substance persists.

Theology has considered soul with special reference to a personal God. It presupposes a substantial survival after death. The present theological idea of soul is largely what is meant by the totality of a man's life. The influence of the church is the greatest factor in moulding ideas in regard to the soul. Recent psychology has tended to ignore the idea although centered about this point it had its birth. It presents a hostile attitude toward the idea. Empirical psychology, dealing only with the phenomena of mind, recognizes no unifying factor but consciousness.

The teachings of the church in regard to the soul reach the thousands, while those of psychology reach the few; the masses of people believe in some soul substance. The effect of psychology is to destroy something—which may be satisfactorily explained for the psychologist, but not for the uneducated. The definition of soul by the average person would be to the effect that the substance of it, so to speak, is found in the feelings. The feelings alone recognize its substance. Modern psychology has not fully investigated the feelings.

#### IDEAS OF MATERIALISTS REGARDING THE SOUL.

A study of the subject is not complete if materialism is not represented.

Materialistic ideas of soul, spirit or mind, represent it as a substance, usually of very fine particles, as, for example, the views of Democritus, those of the Epicureans, the Stoics, Lucretius, and those of certain modern writers. La Mettrie regarded it as a fluid passing through the nerve tubes, and Holbach could not distinguish it from the brain—thought is hidden in the movements of its fibres. For <sup>1</sup>Czolbe sensation is motion, resulting externally; the turning back of this motion in the brain, on itself—from all the senses—forms the unity of consciousness. For Haeckel, spirit and mind are reduced to force and are inseparably connected with the body, as much a

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<sup>1</sup>Lange: History of Materialism.

function as every force is of a body. For Moleschott it is a product of the brain as bile is a product of the liver. For Büchner it is a property, or capacity—as the force of a steam engine inseparable from the steam. Or for others it is an ethereal substance, and it may or may not be a product of the body, as the following:

“The ether,<sup>1</sup> then, as it is coming to be apprehended in the new modes of thought, is an immaterial, superphysical substance, filling all space, carrying in its infinite throbbing bosom the specks of aggregated dynamic force called worlds. It embodies the ultimate spiritual principle, and represents the unity of those forces and energies from which spring, as their source, all phenomena, physical, mental, and spiritual, as they are known to man.”

Or another view is that of a universal liquid of minute molecules.

“The<sup>2</sup> molecules are vortex rings in a liquid of still finer grain and less viscosity. Molecules, liquid, molecules, liquid, alternately forever; each term of the infinite series being fully explained by the next following.” The second ether fashions the spiritual body. Our consciousness proceeds *pari passu* with molecular disturbance in our brains, this molecular disturbance agitates the first ether, which transfers a part of its energy to the second. “Thus is gradually elaborated an organism in that second or unseen universe, with whose motions our consciousness is as much connected as it is with our material bodies.” The spiritual body is replete with energy at death and floats away in the unseen universe, taking consciousness with it, but leaving its molecules behind.

Another view:

“Soul<sup>3</sup> is the body or organ of the mind, and as such they are inseparable forever. Mind and soul are one; soul and body are two. Soul is a refined subtle essence, a spiritual body within the animal body an ultimate indecomposable, ethereal matter, something like an electric body, and as such, quite as material as rock or pig iron, and is conscious by its nature as atoms are cohesive by their nature. . . . It grows as other matter grows, is enduring and persistent like all other elements, preserves its identity and continuity precisely as the body does, and is immortal because of more homogeneous and ultimate essence than the physiology. Repeated shocks will disintegrate and weaken the cohesion of the soul as they will the cohesion of the iron.”

<sup>1</sup>Stockwell: *New Modes of Thought*, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup>Clifford: *Lectures and Essays*, Vol. I, pp. 282-92.

<sup>3</sup>Hemstreet: *Mind is Matter*, pp. 30-39.

It will be observed that some of the so-called materialists regard the soul as a product of the body but do not attempt to ascribe its form or assert what they think to be the nature of its substance. Others would give some theory as to its composition. The ethereal view of soul or mind substance, in the light of recent discoveries, will probably claim for itself a larger circle of adherents.

#### THEORIES PRESENTED REGARDING THE SELF.

The word "self" has tended to take the place of "soul" in recent psychology and philosophy. From the standpoint of philosophy, soul is supposed to be too inclusive;—if immortality is presupposed, there is the objection that it embodies certain elements not immortal, while self, more definitely an object of knowledge is immortal.

The reason why the term "self" is used in preference to that of soul, or why the meaning conveyed may not justify the use of a broader term as that of "soul," may be better understood if we cite some explanations from recent writers.

Prof. James<sup>1</sup> speaks of the empirical self of each person as the "me." The social self is the recognition we get from our fellow beings, the effort of living in the sight of our fellows. Truly speaking "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind."

The spiritual self is the inner or subjective being, the "psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely" not the principle of unity or pure ego. These psychic dispositions are the most ultimate part of the self—and also the most enduring. These are changed only when a man is *alienatus a se*.

The Pure Ego is the unifying factor, in it is found the sense of personal identity. Our remoter, spiritual, material and social selves come with a glow and a warmth, in the aroused organic emotion. This warmth is either something in feeling of the thought, or else the feeling of the body's actual existence. We cannot recognize our present self without one of these. Any distant self which fulfills this condition will have the same warmth, but may be in less degree. This thread that runs through the various selves and unites them is the Ego. Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings constitutes personal identity.

"Of<sup>2</sup> the nature and part of *consciousness* which is the true self we can obtain no direct evidence in reflection, for this true self is that to which the increment is presented, and which itself can never be presented in reflection."

But this is the self of consciousness with which the metaphysician deals. It is that part that is sought for analysis, and is only an inference *ad infinitum*. Mr. Marshall concludes in his article by pointing out that the self *in toto* "speaks of the experience of all our ancestors, of those who were men and of man's long line of progenitors of diverse animal forms." "This self says to us 'The elements which are present in the fields of attentive consciousness represent but a paltry array

<sup>1</sup> Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 294 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Marshall: Instinct and Reason, pp. 107-112.

of experimental effects." This sub-ancestral influence "is not differentiated by the excessive or emphatic partial activity of any part of the complex system; it is the mass of 'feeling' so called by many; it is that part of the moment's conscious experience which we are warranted in describing as the field of inattention." So the true self must "be allied with the presented 'instinct feelings' rather than with variant reason."

From the standpoint of a purely ideal system we may notice Prof. Howison's<sup>1</sup> views. He does not deal with "self" perhaps so much as "mind." In fact objection might be raised as to the justification of classifying his analysis under a study of "self." He assumes that "All existence is either (1) the existence of minds, or (2) the existence of the items and order of their experience; all the existences known as material consisting in certain of these experiences, with an order organized by the self-active forms of consciousness that in their unity constitute the substantial being of a mind, in distinction from its phenomenal life."

These many minds are the determining ground of all events and 'mere' things, and form the eternal world, which he calls the "City of God." God the fulfilled Type of every mind, the living bond of their union reigns in it, by being the impersonated ideal of every mind. The members of this eternal Republic have no origin but a logical one with reference to each other, including their primary reference to God,—in the literal sense no origin in time. There is nothing prior to them out of which their being arises, but they simply are and constitute the eternal order. They are free since they are the source of all the law of this realm. This pluralism of minds is the "mover" of all things. The world of spirits constitutes a circuit of moral relationships, and its union is found in God. God has no being subject to time, nor is the fundamental relation of minds to him a temporal relation, and "creation must simply mean the eternal fact that God is a complete moral agent, that his essence is just a perfect conscience." The key to his system he says "is fixed in its doctrine concerning the system of causation." Efficient cause is reduced and final cause is substituted in its stead, *i. e.*, God is not the end but the guiding, regulative and constitutive principle of real existence.

Another view<sup>2</sup> endeavoring to establish the immortality of the self is that set forth by Prof. Schiller. He notes that the self as it appears is the phenomenal self and the self as the ultimate reality, the transcendental self. The phenomenal self is that part of us that changes with the flow of consciousness, the change of personalities; a knowledge of which is gained by experience and experiment, and an examination of the flow of consciousness. It is not separated from the Ego but this is the unifying part. The phenomenal self represents but a small part of the individual at any time, but the Trans-Ego is the "I" with all its powers and latent capacities of development. The self approximates in its development more and more to the Ego.

The ego is both the basis and end of development within which the selves alone are real. Pre-existence of the soul is not an illusion, it explains the reincarnations of Buddhism. The soul of man has been developed from the souls of animals through a process of evolution.

Bradley recognizes the self as follows:

8 "The self and the world are elements, each separated in, and each contained by, experience. The self is, and likewise the soul is, an intellectual construction based on immediate experience, yet transcend-

<sup>1</sup>The Limits of Evolution.

<sup>2</sup>The Riddle and the Sphinx.

<sup>3</sup>Appearance and Reality, p. 525.

ing it. The self is one of the results gained by transcending the first imperfect form of experience. Experience in the early form is not yet self or not-self. Its unity gives way before inner unrest and outer impact in one."

And then self and Ego, on one side are produced by this development, and on the other side appear other selves and the world and God. These are the contents of our experience, but our experience is part of the universe. So there is no stepping over the line from one world to another. Experience is in both worlds.

For Dr. Royce:

"Self<sup>1</sup> is just your own present imperfectly expressed pulsation of meaning and purpose—this striving, this love, this hate, this hope, this fear,—this inquiry, this inner speech of the instant's will, this thought, this deed, this desire,—in brief this idea taken as an Internal meaning." Self is an ethical category in the sense that one selects from all the Universe a certain portion of remembered and expected life as that of his own, in contact with other selves the large individuality and the life of the Absolute. By the contrast with the not-self I am as sure of myself as of Being; our individuality is expressed by mutually contrasting our life plans, "each reaches its own fulfillment by recognizing other life plans as different from its own." "In the present form of human consciousness self is an ideal, its true place is in the eternal world, where all plans are fulfilled, it derives everything from others except its Uniqueness, God's will is consciously expressed in this."

What can we say from these definitions of self?

It is an analytic explanation, not of the present feelings but of their objectification. The word "self" is more definite than "soul;" it has no uncertain history; it is subject to analysis. We identify and know ourself. By soul we mean both the "ego" and the "me,"—the subject and the object are both included in the soul. The preference for the word self is in line with certain tendencies of thought noted in this paper, *i. e.*, a gradual tendency toward definiteness. Comparisons with the crude undifferentiated ideas of the savage, or with the less definite ideas of soul expressed during the middle ages, show a line of progress that approaches exactness and definition of idea. The "self" has arisen as a result of careful analysis. It has its place in psychology, and any study of the subject would be incomplete without it. If American psychology follows along the lines of the old English school, or if it adheres strictly to an empirical basis, then, with Bacon, "soul" may be relegated to theology. To-day we recognize various aspects of psychology, and among those the psychology of religion. The subject is not one that stands aloof from others. Since it is a study of mind and psychic phenomena in general the psychologist is brought face to face with the soul of theology and he must recognize the significance of the term and its meaning with reference to psychic life as a whole.

As has been often mentioned psychology and philosophy are often harmful to the spiritual life of the student. That one line of study should be destructive to the teachings of another, if they are both for the welfare of the student, is not good pedagogy. The attempt of psychologists to place the subject on a scientific basis has tended to make it assume a hostile attitude. The feelings, because they are not subject to analysis, have not been given a place commensurate with the extent they influence action. A large part of what people call the "soul" is included under the term feelings. The contest is between

<sup>1</sup> The World and The Individual, Vol. II, pp. 272-89.

the two types of mind, the cognitive and the affective, or between cognition and feeling in the same mind; the one relating and classifying, dealing with the world of thoughts; the other acting on that cumulative heritage, the feelings. The analytic self is based more on the present objective side of consciousness, the soul includes both the subjective and objective.

#### LOCALIZATION.

Any study of the soul-idea cannot well omit some mention of the ideas that various writers have expressed as to the part of the body in which the soul is located. The savage expresses his opinion as to where it is located, civilized man expresses his. Certain lines of progress have been made. The main line of progress keeping pace with the advancement of civilization, is the tendency to recognize the head or brain as the central organ in which the soul is located. *Pari passu* with this movement is a gradual change from the identity of soul as a life principle to the notion that it is mind. The material for this section is based very largely on a similar study by Volkmann.<sup>1</sup>

The idea prevailed among some of the ancients that the soul was mere vital power, as such, the blood, filling the whole body was its seat. This idea existed among the ancient Hebrews, and as a result of this they prohibited the use of blood. Psychic functions were not ascribed to the blood but to the heart, and the feelings originated from the intestines, bones, liver, gall and kidneys. The records of the Hebrews after the exile show that they located the soul in the head. References for this may be noted in Daniel;<sup>2</sup> contrary views, however, are also expressed. Among the Hindoos the most significant part of the soul is connected with the heart. It has been observed that localizing the soul in the head above the seat of sensuous pleasure and desire is the first step toward the thought of its immortality. Besides the part in the head most barbarous or semi-civilized peoples recognizing the soul as being complex locate other parts of the same in different organs of the body. The Persians<sup>3</sup> localize anger in the head, thought in the heart, and sensuous desire in the liver. The oldest reports concerning the brain as the seat of the soul point unanimously to Egypt; here the belief in immortality and transmigration was long prevalent. From Egypt Pythagoras is reported to have carried the idea into Greece. The Pythagoreans located the *nous*, or rational soul in the brain, life and sensation in the heart, seed and germination in the navel, generation in the sexual parts. According to Philolaus<sup>4</sup> the first of these contains the germ of men, the second of beasts, the third that of plants, the fourth that of all creatures. Alcmaeon is given the credit of having first taught that all sense organs are connected with the brain. By some he is considered the founder of the doctrine of immortality. Democritus held views similar to those of the Pythagoreans, *viz.*: that the thinking part of the soul is located in the brain, anger in the heart, sensuous desire in the liver, but the soul is extended throughout the body. Plato located the *nous* in the head, the *dumos*, passion, in the breast, the *epidumetikon*, sensuous desire, in the abdomen, the parts being distinctly bounded. The influence of certain organs which may from some cause demand undue attention tending to change the course of the individual thought, or attention to them is an important factor determining localization. This may have been due to some individual trait or tendency of the

<sup>1</sup> Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Vol. I, pp. 80-90.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. II, 28; IV, 5; II, 30.

<sup>3</sup> Delitzsch: A System of Biblical Psychology, p. 298

<sup>4</sup> Ziller: Pre-Socratic Phil., Vol. I, p. 480.

writer or teacher or to some pathological condition, thus giving undue predominance to some organs. Aristotle opposed the separation of the soul as made by Plato. For him the perceiving and nourishing parts in man, and animals having a heart and circulating system are located in the heart. In the case of those animals having no such system, the soul is located in that part exercising the function of the heart. In plants and in animals that manifest life after being cut to pieces each part may be the seat of the soul, or at least they have that possibility. The principle of motion, sensation and nourishment must be located in a middle point of the body where the exchange of blood takes place. The brain cannot be the seat of sensation because on immediate contact it is painless, it is the foulest, dampest part of the body, as opposed to the heart streaming with fire-colored blood. The Epicureans located the rational part of the soul in the heart or lungs, while the irrational was thought to be diffused throughout the whole body. Herophilus of Alexander and Galen, under Platonic influence, and also under the influence of Hippocrates, permanently located the thinking part of the soul in the brain; this they also recognized as the organ of memory. Galen ascribed to the lower soul part, that in the rump, the preparation of vital spirits. Xenocrates located the rational soul in the crown of the head, Strato in the middle of the forehead between the eyebrows. In the change of position in localization of the soul, its gradual transference to the head, can be noted the change of the idea of the soul to that of a something having to do with the mind, and in fact a gradual identification of it with the mental processes. Neo-platonic doctrine located the soul in the whole body,—entirely in each part of the same. Nemesis—following the psychology of Aristotle, locates the soul as coincident with the body, placing phantasie in the anterior, memory in the posterior, and intellect in the middle ventricle of the brain.

Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Augustine prefer a symmetrical division of the vital soul throughout the whole body; Gregory opposes locating it either in the brain or heart, while Augustine recognizes the heart as the central point of the corporeal life and involuntary motion, the brain as the central organ of sensation and voluntary motion, sensation originates in the anterior, motion in the posterior, and remembrance in the middle part of the brain.

Thomas Aquinas located different activities of the thinking soul in different parts of the brain. His doctrine of location practically overthrew the Aristotelian view of the heart as the seat of the soul. The nervous system has begun to be an object of study. Cossman opposed the ancient location of the soul from the standpoint of nervous anatomy, and recognized the brain as the common sensorium of external sense as well as the immediate organ of inner sense. With Descartes the conception of the soul as a unity, opposed to the body, excluded the idea of its being separated. From his mechanical conception of the body, and his knowledge of the nervous system, he reasoned that there must be some central point, undivided, from which the motive forces of the body originate. Thus the pineal gland, as a single organ, was selected. Lancisi and Bonnet<sup>1</sup> located the soul in the corpus callosum, Digby in the transparent septum, Haller in the pons, Boerhaave in the prolonged cord, Plattner in the corpora quadrigemini. Sommering made one of the last attempts in this direction, but he avoided the older theories of glands and certain brain parts, and pointed to the fluid in the brain ventricles—as the water over which the spirit floats or is suspended.

Leibnitz did not consider the soul to be located at any one point in

<sup>1</sup> Volkmann: Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Vol. I, p. 88.

the body, but thought it spread out through all the cells; Bumgartner followed out the same idea, and claimed that the soul has no place, not even in space, but that its identity is preserved through its relation to the other monads. Since the time of Kant the question has fallen into more or less discredit. In his earlier writings Kant granted that in the mind of a visionary or enthusiast there are ideas of a spiritual substance which occupy space, but do not fill it. In his later works he corrects this view. The futility of physiological attempts on the one hand, and the attention given to the dynamic conception on the other, are favorable to the idea of the whole body as the seat of the soul, with the nervous system instead of the blood as the basis. J. Müller,<sup>1</sup> from a study of the localization of the senses and also from studies of parts of dismembered organisms that continue to live, concluded that the soul is co-extensive with the body, but the brain the fundamental organ. Most of the school of the philosophy of identity took this view. For Fischer the unconscious soul has its seat in the organon, outside of the nervous system, the conscious soul in the entire nervous system, and in the brain as the central point in so far as the latter, as a central point, outweighs the other parts of the system. Fichte held similar ideas; in a wide sense the whole body is the organ of the soul, in a narrow sense the nervous system, for the soul is everywhere that it operates, with this modification, that definite parts of the nervous system determine definite functions of the soul, as for example one function of the hemispheres is consciousness. For Schopenhauer the whole organism is the objectification of the will, the brain that of the intellect. For the Hegelian school the category of space can have no significance for soul as subjective spirit, it is lost through the whole organism, everywhere centre and everywhere periphery. It is outside of space, and not a mathematical point. What is in the brain is at no time soul, for the soul is only subject. "The soul is everywhere and at all times for I wander with thought through all ages and through the whole universe" (Eschenmayer). Ennemoser found in the whole question as to the localization of the soul an interesting chapter in human foolishness.

Fortlage placed the question beside that of the old question of locating the earth in the centre of the universe or that of reducing things to the simplicity of the four elements. The localization of the soul as a whole, or at least the rational part of it has passed over into the question of localization of function of the cortex. Phrenology gave this a great impetus, and every disproof of the crudeness and worthlessness of phrenology led to a more thorough and exact study of the brain. Lange<sup>2</sup> observes that "Instead of one soul phrenology gives us nearly forty, each in itself as mysterious as the life of the soul is generally. Instead of resolving it into real elements it resolves it into personal beings of various character. Men and animals, etc., most complicated of machines are the most familiar to us. We forget that there is something to be explained in them, or we only find the matter clear when we can imagine everywhere little men over again, who are the bearers of the entire activity."

Huschke<sup>3</sup> taught that to the medulla oblongata, and to the cerebrum belong willing, to the parietal lobes feeling, and to the frontal lobes thinking. Carus found the original seat of the soul in the corpora quadrigemini, but there is a three-fold division of mind.

Lotze<sup>4</sup> considered bodily affections necessary for the soul, as these

<sup>1</sup> Volkmann: *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, Vol. I, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> *History of Materialism*, Vol. III, p. 124.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>4</sup> *Medicin Psychologie*, Chap. III.

are converted into sensations and elaborated through its own action. Nerve fibres are necessary for some of the processes of the soul, for other processes organs are needed, and for some neither nerve fibres nor organ is necessary. The soul is probably located in that part of the brain where there are no fibres, because there is no central point where all the fibres meet.

For Fechner, in a wider sense, the soul is located in the entire body, in the narrower sense (that of consciousness), in a part of the nervous system; this part, as we descend the scale of the animal kingdom, increases in extent or becomes more generalized.

One of the last theories of localization is that of Pflüger.<sup>1</sup> By means of his well known experiment he attributed a soul to the spinal cord of the frog, lizard, etc. His method was as follows: A decapitated frog is smeared on the back with acid, it wipes the drop away with the most convenient foot; if this foot is now cut off at the thigh, and more acid placed on the same spot, after some unsuccessful attempts with the stump, it will complete the movement with the opposite foot. This process of changing he thought indicates reflection. Within itself it is no mere reflex act, so he predicated the spinal soul. To disprove the theory Goltz placed two frogs, a decapitated one and another in perfect condition in water. This is gradually raised to the boiling point. The decapitated frog makes no effort to escape, the normal one struggles to free itself. From this Goltz concludes that there is no soul in the cord.

The experimenters in these cases are not dealing with the "soul" of the middle ages, but something akin to consciousness. So with all the later ideas of localization, it is rather one of function, *i. e.*, determining precisely what a certain organ means, or contributes toward motivating the organism or to its welfare, rather than fitting a functioning, and perhaps immortal, soul on some organ. Bosanquet<sup>2</sup> speaks of the soul thus: "Probably most of us at one time thought that *mind* is a *thing* which thinks and seems to move the body with which it is co-extensive—without any assignable mechanism. As we begin to be educated we find out, *e. g.*, that mind is not present at the tips of the fingers where we seem to feel; that the actual skin and flesh is not sensitive, but only the nerve upon pressure of which feeling follows. A further stage of the same discovery is when he learns that if a nerve is cut anywhere between finger and brain there will not be any sensation in the finger, so that really the feeling at the finger tips is not a mistake but an illusion. Then must all remember when we found out—what Mill points out—that the will is not magical, that, *e. g.*, a numbed arm will not move. That is, the sequence of movement upon will is not infallible, is not magical, but depends upon a certain mechanism that may go wrong; we do not know whether it will really act except by trying. Experience of this kind make us withdraw the magical notion of the will from the outlying parts of the body, until in popular culture, we get a sort of idea of the soul as a little creature sitting in the brain."

This sketch shows that certain substitutions have been made in the idea of localization. An empirical mind derived largely from the senses has taken the place of the dim, mystical, idea, which was a combination of life and soul, vitality and mind, held by the ancients. This has its basis in the functioning of a normal nervous system, instead of the blood, some organ connected with circulation or digestion. The change of idea has been gradual, and has been made only with the development of science. Modern psychology recognizes the brain

<sup>1</sup> Goltz: Die Functionen der Nerven-Centren des Frosches, p. 110 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Psychology of the Moral Self, pp. 115-125.

as the organ of cognition, but the feelings and emotions are not definitely located.

In concluding this study of the soul, however barren and fruitless it may be as to exact definition, yet it is not without some results. However analytic the psychologist may be he is still hopeful, optimistic and charitable in his beliefs. Prof. James grants that the mind is immortal, Prof. Royce recognizes as immortality of the soul the survival of one's "purpose" in life, or of a certain "internal meaning." The subject matter of neither psychology nor philosophy has yet been fully adjusted to the theory of evolution. It is probable that when these are worked out on the basis of development a constructive attitude will be taken. Instead of deriving "soul" by a process of analysis the elements from which it has developed will be pointed out. It may be that the traits of character exhibited by the various species of animals are the elements from which the soul of man has evolved. Analysis alone will never fully explain what is meant. By soul the mass of people have in mind, besides the thoughts that may have aroused them, the waves of feeling that rise in them when they think of certain experiences. The feelings are the common heritage of the race, and the fact that we share a common feeling makes society possible. The soul of religion, psychology, and philosophy should be one, representing as they do two sides of the same phenomenon. While philosophy presents the cognitive side to us theology presents the side of feeling.

It is poor pedagogy to present to the student ideas along one line of thought that are destructive to a related system of ideas. Educators who have to deal with elementary and secondary education have striven to correlate different studies, that certain ones may be contributory to others, and that they may make for the harmonious development of the pupil. This principle holds true none the less for studies beyond the period of secondary education. The order in which the subject matter of philosophy is presented often does the student more harm than good. Theology and philosophy should be in harmony; the ideas of the soul derived from psychology, while they should be exhaustive, should contribute to the teachings of theology. The idea of the soul will continue as long as people desire survival after death. Our study of the subject leads to the following definitions: for educated thoughtful people the soul probably represents an ethical ideal, in a general way this may be embodied in certain principles, while the majority of Christian people refer to an undefinable mass of feelings.